TOGETHER FIRST

A global system that works for all

Is a multiplier?	**Data sections?**	**Is organisation?**
Yes	Nodes	Yes
Climate change	**Conflict or political violence**	**Short**
Global catastrophic risks mitigated	**Risk multipliers managed**	**Implementation timeframe**

DETAILS

Closing the Climate and Security Governance Gap

How Sanctioned Climate and Security Mechanisms Can Multiply Peace Dividends

Over the past few years, policymakers have struggled with the climate-security nexus have intensified at the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral bodies, as well as in research communities. Research shows that the links between climate and security are indirect, but that climate can multiply and accelerate security, contributing towards instability, violence, crime, open conflict, and even violent extremism. A series of seven resolutions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have acknowledged the relevance of climate change to peace and security, and both Sweden and Germany have raised this "flag" as one of their top priorities while occupying non-permanent seats at the Council.

The topic has algo gained visibility through engagement by top leadership in New York. Secretary-General António Guterres has given speeches recognizing the need to address the links between climate and security. There have also been some institutional innovations. In 2018, a Climate and Security was launched to develop new risk assessments and toolkits for the broader UN system. The Mechanism has received seed funding as well as expanding political backing by a Group of Friends that, to date, counts on over forty member states.

Therefore, incorporation of climate and security into global governance has only begun to emerge. Despite the clear need to mainstream climate and security, institutional homes are also needed to anchor debates, formulate normative frameworks, and drive initiatives and policies at all levels. At one end of the spectrum, some actors argue that climate should constitute a fourth pillar of the UN system, in which climate and security would find a natural institutional home. At the other end, some have defended that, rather than contributing to the silo effect that has plagued the UN since its inception, all of the parts of the system should be rushing to incorporate climate and security into their assessments, frameworks, and responses. A more balanced approach would instead recognize that advancing on this front against considerable political and financial offds requires both institutionalizing and mainstreaming climate and security in key components of the global governance system.

Given the evidence showing the world is approaching a "point of no return" in climate change, creating a governance system for C&S at this particular time has never been more urgent. Yet this task also faces unique challenges. International climate regimes, not least the Paris Agreement, have come under attacks from populist nationalists and have experienced reversals as key players either withdraw or lag behind in commitments, and/or seek to undermine the progress of negotiations and implementation. COP-25 showed little progress on negotiations around key controversial issues such as Article 6 of the agreement.

At the same time, the institutionalization of climate and security depends in part on persuading a number of key players that incorporating climate change into security assessments will lead to more effective tackling of security issues rather than greater interventionism, excessive securitization, or undesired crossing over into firmly guarded policy territories. Some of those players are reluctant to endorse this agenda due to territorialism or belief that the Council agenda is already stretched thin without incorporating new topics.

Nevertheless, the international community must advance on this governance front, and not just through the UNSC. Even as climate and security policy debates have appeared within the UNSC they continue to lag behind in other parts of the UN system. There is interest and even urgency on the part of senior UN officials from all three pillars of the architecture—development, human rights and peace and security-- but there is also puzzlement at how to go about

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How Sanctioned Climate and Security Mechanisms Can Multiply Peace Dividends
boosting the institutional capacity and reach of the UN Climate and Security Mechanism and promoting the mainstreaming of climate- and security- sensitive risk assessments across the system.

integrating climate and security into a preventive approach.

[illegible] global governance

The structural reforms led by SG Guterres offer an opportunity to strengthen climate and security not only at the [illegible] Secretariat, but also at the country level. The key step for institutiondlization would consist of an annual Secretary [illegible] General's report on Climate and Security with inputs from across the system. The Climate and Security Mechanism [illegible] should develop a more robust capacity-building function to help components of the system to tailor their tools to the [illegible] particular needs, for instance through the creation of a "Climate and Security Mobile Training Unit" that would [illegible] circulate within the system, both at the secretariat and at regional and national contexts, as demands emerge. [illegible]

Nevertheless, there is interest and even urgency on the part of senior UN officials from all three pillars of the [illegible] architecture—development, human rights and peace and security--regarding how to go about integrating climate [illegible] and security into a preventive approach.

The structural reforms led by Secretary General Antonio Guterres offer an opportunity to build climate and security not only into UN structures at the Secretariat level, but also at the country level. At the Secretariat, the first key step for institutionalization would consist of an annual Secretary General's report on Climate and Security with inputs from across the system. In addition, the Climate and Security Mechanism should be granted a more robust capacity-building function to help components of the system to tailor their tools to the particular needs, for instance through the creation of a "Climate and Security Mobile Training Unit" that would circulate within the system, both at the organizations, including the African Union, European Union, ASEAN and Organization of American States. Some secretariat and at regional and national contexts as demands emerge. And, even within the Security Council, only a regional organizations, such as the Pacific Forum and CARICOM, have begun to approach climate and security in few select crises on the agenda, such as those around Syria, Sahel and Yemen, are being debated taking climate into ways that are tailored to the stressors and impacts being felt or being projected for those particular regions of the account in risk assessments.

In addition, climate and security analysis must be mainstreamed into the Security Council agenda and brought into a wider variety of debates at the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. At the country level, the Climate and Security Mechanism's small staff has no Global South members, although the Group of Friends has become more diversified. Yet climate change affects the entire planet, and some of the more vulnerable parts of the globe are located within the global north, such as the Arctic region, which is also one of the world's most politically sensitive areas. Leaving out the global nature of the climate and security challenge may reinforce suspicions among some Global South players that this is yet another North-driven agenda meant to advance the geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of global powers.

The UN's 75th birthday offers a chance to boost climate action by bringing attention to the overlooked security consequences of climate change through a combination of institutionalization and mainstreaming.